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BRIAN J. O'CONNOR co-chairs the Tax and Wealth Planning Group for the Washington, D.C. based law firm of
Venable LLP. Mr. O'Connor practices in the areas of partnership, corporate, real estate and international
taxation. Mr. O'Connor also teaches an advanced course on partnership taxation and the drafting of
partnership agreements as an adjunct professor at Georgetown University Law Center. He regularly speaks
across the country to professional groups on topics relating to business entities and taxation and is the author
or co-author of numerous articles relating to business entities and taxation in professional journals and trade
publications, including The Journal of Taxation, The Journal of Pass-through Entities, Tax Notes, Tax
Management Real Estate Journal and Business Entities. Mr. O'Connor also has acted as a primary participant
in the publication of the nationally recognized treatise Tax Planning for Real Estate Transactions.
has been regularly selected for The Best Lawyers in America for both Tax Law and Tax Litigation and
Controversy and has been regularly included in Maryland Super Lawyers. Further, Mr. O'Connor was recently
named a {(Tax Lawyer of the Year" for Maryland. Before joining Venable, Mr. O'Connor was an attorney
advisor for the Office of Chief Counsel for the Internal Revenue Service where he participated in high profile
legislative projects and drafted regulations and other published guidance relating to pass-through entities.
received his J.D. degree, magna cum laude, from Washington & Lee University and his LL.M. degree in
Taxation, with distinction and the program's highest possible grade point average, from Georgetown University
Law Center. Mr. O'Connor is a member of the Virginia, Maryland and District of Columbia Bars as well as the
Tax Sections for the Virginia, Maryland and American Bar Associations.
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• On July 22, 2015, the Treasury Department and the IRS released proposed
regulations that would, if adopted, substantially curtail the use of
management fee waivers. Generally, the regulations would characterize
many of these arrangements as disguised payments for services.
• While the proposed regulations are aimed at management fee waivers, the
scope of the proposed regulations is broad and could affect the taxation of
certain grants of profits interests more generally
• The regulations are proposed to be effective when final regulations are
published. However, the preamble to the proposed regulations states that
pending publication of final regulations, the position of the Treasury
Department and the IRS is that the proposed regulations generally reflect
Congressional intent as to which arrangements are appropriately treated as
disguised payments for services.
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• Private equity funds {including venture capital funds) are pools of capital that
make investments in private companies ({{Portfolio Companies"). The
majority are structured as limited partnerships (some are structured as LLCs)
• The fund sponsors are the general partners ("GPs") and the investors
(typically institutional investors or high net worth investors) are the limited
partners
• The GP typically receives three sources of income from the fund:
- A 20% (or perhaps higher) share of overall profits (the "Carried Interest")
- A right to share in profits and losses from the fund based on the GP's
required capital contribution (typically 1% but often at least 3% of overall
capital contributions) (the ucapitallnterest")
- A management fee {typically 2% of capital commitments). This is often
received by a separate management company owned by the same
persons (the "Principals") that own the GP.
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• The market has evolved to require the GP to increase its Capital Interest or
{{skin in the game."
• Typically the GP would receive a management fee pay ordinary income tax on
that income, and then use after tax income to make its capital contributions
with respect to their Capital Interests. This was tax inefficient and very often
could lead to cash flow issues for the GP and the Principals.
' As a result, parties started implementing the management fee waiver
mechanism. The basic idea is the GP (or the management company) waives
all or a portion of the management fee in exchange for aspecial allocation of
the fund's future profits. The GP's cash commitment with respect to the
Capital Interest is reduced by the amount of the waived fee. This effectively
allows the GP to make capital contributions on a pre tax basis. Moreover, the
allocation typically is of long term capital gain (or qualified dividend income),
so the GP converts ordinary income into long term capital gain.
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• Two most common forms are of management fee waivers are:
- Pure management fee waivers pursuant to which the special profit
allocation cannot exceed the amount of the waiver management fee. For
example, if the GP waives $1 million of management fees, it eventually
will receive a special allocation of profits capped at $1 million
- "Cashless contributions" pursuant to which the amount of waived
management fee is treated as a deemed investment by the GP in the
fund relating to a particular Portfolio Company. This deemed investment
has the potential to earn the same return (or suffer the same loss} as
cash investments made by the Limited Partners in such Portfolio
Company. For example, assume the $1 million in the prior example is
deemed invested in Portfolio Company A. The GP would receive future
profits (if available) equal to (a) the $1 million deemed investment plus or
minus (b) the profits and losses deemed earned by the GP from its
investment in Portfolio Company A.
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• The theory supporting the management fee waiver arrangement is that the waiver
results in a bona fide allocation because the right to be allocated sufficient profits
(and receive corresponding distributions) is subject to significant entrepreneurial
risk. Note that if there are not sufficient profits, the GP will not receive its waived
management fee (and the profits or losses thereon in the case of a cashless
contribution).
• IRC Section 707(a){2){A) attempts to distinguish between bona fide partnership
allocations and disguised payments for services. In particular, if a partner
performs services for a partnership, there is a related allocation and distribution to
such partner, and the performance of services and the related allocation and
distribution are properly treated as a disguised payment for services, then the
transaction is treated as such. The legislative history to IRC Section 707{a)(2) says
that the most important factor in determining whether the transaction would be
respected as an allocation or treated as a disguised payment for services is
whether the payment is subject to significant entrepreneurial risk.
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• GPs were structuring the waiver to maximize the likelihood that there would
be sufficient profits to match the future allocation. Examples include:
- Allocations made solely out of gross income
- Aspecial allocation of profits earned by the fund in a particular tax year,
even if the fund did not earn profits on an overall basis.
• For example, assume the GP waives a$1 million management fee on
formation of the fund. Assume the fund loses $1 million per year in
each of years 1 through 3. In year 4 the fund makes $1 million in
profit, which is specially allocated on a priority basis to the GP.
Overall, the fund has lost $2 million, but is able to allocate $1 million
of profits to the GP solely in respect of year 4.
- These practices generally meant there was little economic risk that the
future allocation would not be paid. As discussed below, the proposed
regulations address these and other perceived abuses.
IJ
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•

The carried interest and the management fee waiver mechanism each is aform of {(profits interest." A
profits interest entitles its holder to future profits and appreciation in partnership assets. For example, if
an existing partnership worth $100 grants aservice provider a 10% profits interest, and the partnership
sells its assets for $100, the service receives gets $0.

•

The tax treatment of a profits interest is addressed in Revenue Procedure 93-27. Generally, under Rev.
Proc. 93-27, the service provider is not taxed on receipt of the profits interest issued in exchange for
services performed or to be performed to or for the benefit of a partnership. The service partner is
treated as a partner, and if the partnership ultimately realizes long term capital gain on sale of its assets,
the service provider is taxed at favorable long term capital gains rates.

•

Revenue Procedure 93-27 does not apply if:
- the profits interest relates to asubstantially certain and predictable stream of income from
partnership assets;
- within two years of receipt, the partner disposes of the profits interest; or
- the profits interest is a limited partnership interest in a publicly traded partnership.

•

As discussed below, the preamble to the proposed regulations proposes to issue a new exception from
Rev. Proc. 93-27 where the profits interest is issued in connection with a partner foregoing payment of a
substantially fixed amount. The preamble also says the IRS intends to deny the safe harbor in other
common situations (e.g. where one party waives the management fee and a related party receives the
allocation). While these exceptions are focused on the management fee waiver arrangements, they
potentially have broader application.
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• In determining whether afee waiver arrangement will be treated as a
disguised payment for services, in whole or in part, the Proposed Regulations
adopt afacts and circumstances test.
• Under this test} if afee waiver lacks significant entrepreneurial risk ("SER"),
the fee waiver will be taxed as an ordinary income payment for services to
the recipient.
• On the other hand, if there is real economic risk as to the amount of any
future allocation/ then the arrangement, as a general matter, may have SER
and the prospect of future capital gain treatment.
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' The Proposed Regulations adopt a new six non-exclusive factor test to
determine whether an arrangement constitutes a disguised payment for
.
serv1ces.
• The first of the six factors- SER- is accorded the most weight in the analysis.
' As a result, arrangements without SER essentially automatically qualify as
disguised payments for services as opposed to distributive shares of income.
' Whether an arrangement lacks SER is based on the service provider's
entrepreneurial risk relative to the overall entrepreneurial risk of the
partnership.

12

• Certain arrangements are presumed to lack SER because they are highly likely to
provide the service provider with an income allocation regardless of the overall
success of the business operation:
- Capped allocations where the cap is reasonably expected to be reached
- Allocations for afixed number of years
- Allocations of gross income items
- Certain allocations predominantly fixed in amount and reasonably determinable
- Certain arrangements where the service provider waives rights to a payment for
future services
• Arrangements suggesting that a SER exists:
- Future allocation is based on net profits
- Future allocation is subject to a clawback obligation
- Recipient is reasonably likely to comply fully with any repayment responsibilities
- Future allocation is not certain to be available nor reasonably determinable at the
time of the arrangement
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• {{Catch-up" Allocations
- A {{catch-up" allocation is a disproportionate allocation of income or gain to a service
provider to {{catch the service provider up" to a proportionate capital account position.
- For example, a service provider may receive a 10% profits interest with a $0 capital account
and allocations of 100% of future gain until the service provider's capital account
ultimately equals 10% of the capital accounts of all partners.
- Preamble to Proposed Regulations states that catch-up allocations generally will not lack
SER.
• Treatment of {{Greater-of" Situations
- Under existing regulations, if a partner is entitled to an allocation of the greater of 30% of
partnership income or a minimum guaranteed amount, the entire allocation qualifies as a
distributive share of income if it exceeds the minimum guaranteed amount.
- The Proposed Regulations will change this result by providing that the entire minimum
guaranteed amount is treated as aguaranteed payment regardless of whether the
minimum guaranteed amount is reached.
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• The Proposed Regulations also provide additional factors of secondary importance in
determining whether an arrangement constitutes a payment for services.
• The weight given to each of these factors depends on the particular case and the
absence of a particular factor is not determinative.
• Additional Factors of Secondary Importance include:
- Transitory holdings of a partnership interest
- Time frame for allocation and distribution mirrors the time frame within which a
non-partner service provider would typically receive payment
- Service provider becomes a partner primarily to obtain tax benefits which otherwise
would not be available
- Value of service provider's interest in continuing profits is small in relation to the
allocation and distribution
- Certain arrangements providing for (i) different allocations or distributions for
different services received where (ii) the services have differing levels of
entrepreneurial risk and are provided by the same person or related parties
15

• The Preamble to the Proposed Regulations states that the IRS is likely to issue
new guidance for applying Rev. Proc. 93-27.
• Specifically, the new guidance will add a fourth exception for profits interests
issued in connection with a partner foregoing a payment.
• In addition, the new guidance is likely to remove from the safe harbor under
Rev. Proc. 93-27 all profits interests where one party provides services and a
related party receives aseemingly associated profits interest.
• For example, if a management company providing services for afee waives
the fee while a related party receives a profits interest the value of which
approximates the amount of the waived fee, Rev. Proc. 93-27 is likely to not
apply in the future.
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• An investment partnership acquires a portfolio of assets that are neither
readily tradable nor readily valued. M performs services for which afee
would normally be charged. Instead of receiving afee, M contributes
$500,000 for (i) a 1% interest in partnership capital and profits and (ii} a
priority allocation and distribution of net income from asale during any 12
month period in which the partnership has overall net gain in an amount
intended to approximate the charge forM's services.
• The GP, who controls M directs partnership operations, causes the
partnership to buy and sell assets during any period; and controls the timing
of distributions.
• GP will be allocated 10% of any net profits and losses of the partnership
earned over the life of the partnership. Aclawback obligation is in effect and
GP is expected to comply fully with repayment obligations.
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• M's arrangement is treated as a disguised payment for services as opposed to
a distributive share of partnership income because (i) the amount of net
income that will be allocated to M is highly likely to be available and
reasonably determinable based on all the facts and circumstances at the time
of partnership formation; and (ii) the allocation to M does not depend on the
overall success of the partnership.
• GP's arrangement, however, will qualify as a distributive share of income and
will not be recharacterized as a disguised payment for services.
• The GP 1s arrangement has SER because the allocation is out of net profits
earned over the life of the partnership and subject to a clawback obligation
with which the GP is reasonably expected to comply.
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• GP in ABC partnership is responsible for providing services to ABC but has
delegated its responsibilities toM (a company controlled by GP). GP is
entitled to 20% of future ABC net income and gains measured over ABC's life.
Amount is neither highly likely to be available nor reasonably determinable
based on facts &circumstances available upon ABC's formation. GP
undertakes a clawback obligation and is expected that GP could &would
comply fully with any such repayment obligations.
• M is entitled to 2% annual fee from committed capital. If M waives
irrevocably its annual fee 60 days before the beginning of the partnership
taxable year, ABC will issue to M a profits interest for the year in the amount
of the estimated value of the fee. Amount of net income or gains allocable to
M is neither highly likely to be available nor reasonably determinable based
on facts and circumstances of ABC.
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• Do the facts and circumstances suggest the presence or absence of SER?
• The allocations to A and M do not presumptively lack SER under the
proposed regulations.
• M waives the right to afee before the period begins, the allocations are
based on net profits, the allocations are subject to a clawback obligation over
the fund's life and A and M are expected to comply fully with this obligation,
and the allocations are neither reasonably determinable nor highly likely to
be available.
• Accordingly, arrangements have SER qualify as distributive shares of income
as opposed to disguised payments for services.
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• In a surprising move, the Treasury and the IRS also addressed issues with
preferred interests and targeted capital account arrangements in the
Preamble to the Proposed Regulations.
• In short, the Preamble seems to express atentative view and requests
comments on the treatment of preferred interests in certain targeted capital
account arrangements where the preferred returns attributable to those
interests for the year exceed partnership net income for the year.
• For example, if the preferred return allocable to a preferred interest holder
equals $10 while the net income of the partnership equals only $8, is the
additional $2 of preferred return over and above net income ignored, treated
as an allocation of gross income or treated as a guaranteed payment?
• Note that this issue does not arise if the partnership liquidates based on
partner capital accounts.
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• The Proposed Regulations are not effective until the final regulations are
published and would apply only to arrangements entered into or modified on
or after such date.
• Nevertheless, the Preamble provides that "pending the publication of final
regulations, the position of the Treasury Department and the IRS is that the
proposed regulations generally reflect Congressional intent as to which
arrangements are appropriately treated as disguised payments for services
• Will the IRS begin reviewing arrangements through the lens of these
Proposed Regulations despite their stated effective date or are the Proposed
Regulations intended only to create a "chilling effect"?
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